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Traditionally, power was what was seen, what was shown and 
what was manifested and, paradoxically, found the principle 
of its force in the movement by which it deployed that 
force. Those on whom it was exercised could remain in the 
shade; they received light only from that portion of power 
that was conceded to them, or from the reflection of it that 
for a moment they carried. 
Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish, (p. 187) 
The Politics of Caste 
In pre-colonial Hindu India, the king--both as an historical 
figure and as a trope for the complex political dynamics 
underlying the Indian social order--was a central ordering factor 
in the social organization of caste. This statement directly 
opposes the prevailing theories of comparative sociology, and in 
particular the theoretical position of Louis Dumont (1980). As 
is well known, Dumont holds that the political and economic 
domains of social life in India are encompassed by the 
nreligious.n The religious principle becomes articulated in 
terms of the opposition of purity and impurity. For Dumont, the 
Brahman represents the religious principle, inasmuch as the 
Brahman represents the highest form of purity attainable by 
Hindus. The king, while important and powerful, represents the 
political domain, and is accordingly inferior to, and encompassed 
by, the Brahman. 
There are in fact many textual confirmations of the view 
that Brahmans, and the spiritual authority (brahma) that they 
possess, are seen as higher, both relationally and ontologically, 
than kings, and the temporal authority (ksatra) that is theirs. 
However, these same texts provide evidence as well of what has 
been called "the central conundrum of Indian social ideology" 
(Trautmann 1981; also see Heesterman 1978). At times the king is 
above the Brahman, as for example in the royal consecration 
ceremony. At other times the Brahman appears to be superior to 
the king, as for example in the Manu Dharma Sastras, and in 
passages from the Mahabharata. This conundrum is often addressed 
in terms of the postulation of two levels of truth, a higher 
level in which the Brahman is clearly preeminent, the source of 
everything else, and a lower level in which kings must protect 
and sponsor Brahmans in order for them to exist, as gods, on 
earth. Dumont's resolution of this conundrum extends the notion 
of higher and lower truths from a classically Indic 
epistemological contextuality to his well known ontological 
separation of the religious from the political. The major 
development of political thought in India, he contends, is the 
secularization of kingship, that is the separation of the magico- 
religious nature of kingship--preserved in the form of the royal 
chaplain in particular and in the function of Brahmans in the 
larger polity more generally--from the political aspects of 
kingship, depicted, inter alia, in the Machiavellian Arthasastra 
While Dumont is not wrong to insist on radical differences 
in the "ideologies" of India and the West, the irony is that the 
way in which he postulates difference is based on a fundamentally 
Western ideology, in which religion and politics must be 
separated. Dumont 's ~ o s  i t ion in many ways caracatures the 
Orientalist assumption that India is the spiritual east, devoid 
of history, untouched by the politics of Oriental Despotisms. 
Critics of Dumont have often accepted his basic epistemological 
premises, but then reversed them. They take a materialist 
perspective and view social relations in India in terms of power, 
pure and simple (e.g., Berreman 1971). Recent work--often by 
those committed to an ethnosociological approach to the 
identification and description of cultural domains in India--has 
suggested that this separation of religion from politics, like 
many other dichotomies in Western social science, is 
inappropriate at the level of ideological (or cultural) analysis 
in Indian social thought (~arriott and Inden 1977; Appadurai 
1981; McGilvray 1983; Dirks 1982, 1987). It is in this sense--as 
also of course in the running critique of Dumont--that the 
following analysis is ethnosociological. 
Not only is there no fundamental ontological separation of a 
"religious" from a "political" domain, but religious institutions 
and activities are fundamental features of what wedescribe here 
as the political system. Kings derive much of their power from 
worship, and bestow their emblems and privileges in a cultural 
atmosphere that is permeated by the language and attitudes of 
worship. Further, temples are key institutions in the formation 
of social communities (Appadurai and Breckenridge 1976), even 
while they reflect structures of power worked out both in and 
outside their own walls (Dirks 1987). In turn, temples represent 
the preeminent position of the king by granting him the highest 
honor in the temple, before even the learned (srotriya) brahman. 
Religion does not encompass kingship any more than kingship 
encompasses religion. There are not two distinct forms of power, 
secular power had by kings and sacred power had by Brahmans. 
Kings and Brahmans are both privileged but different forms of 
divinity in a world in which all beings were, however distantly, 
generated from the same ontological source. And power--whether 
defined as a constellation of cultural conceits or as an analytic 
concern--can not be restricted to a single domain of Indian 
social life. 
Dumont has suggested that caste is fundamentally religious, 
and that religious principles actualize themselves in the domain 
of purity and pollution. In my ethnohistorical study of a south 
Indian kingdom in which Kallars were the royal caste and Brahmans 
were heavily patronized according to scripturally mandated forms 
of royal gifting activity, I have found that purity and pollution 
are not the primary relational coordinates which endow hierarchy 
with its meaning and substance. Royal honor (mariyatai, antastu) 
combined with the notions of restriction, command, and order 
(kattupatu, atikaram, orunku) are the key discursive components 
which are embedded in and productive of the nature and order of 
hierarchical relations. 
My analysis will, I hope, do more than simply contest Dumont 
over the issue of which key terms underlie the structural logic 
of hierarchy in South Asia. Indeed, I wish to reintroduce 
concerns with power, hegemony, and history into studies of 
culturally constructed structures of thought, whether 
structuralist or ethnosociological. The forms and relations of 
power in southern India efface our social scientific distinctions 
of materialist etics from culturalist emics, for even the domain 
of ritual action and language suggests the complex and 
conjunctural foundations of hierarchical relations. At least 
this is true among the Kallars of Pudukkottai, less affected 
perhaps than most other groups by colonialism and the demise of 
the old regime in the nineteenth century. For the concerns of 
comparative sociology are not only the products of a nineteenth 
century Orientalism, but also of the colonial intervention that 
removed the politics from society and created a contradictory 
form of civil society--with caste its fundamental institution--in 
its place. It was not only convenient to render caste 
independent of political variables; but necessary to do so in 
order to rule an immensely complex society by a variety of 
indirect means. Colonial sociology represented the eighteenth 
century as decadent, and all legitimate Indian politics as past. 
Under colonialism, caste was appropriated, and in many respects 
reinvented, by the British. However, the British were able to 
change caste because caste continued to be permeable to political 
influence. Ethnohistorical reconstruction is thus important not 
only for historians confronting new problems of data and 
analysis, but for anthropologists who confront in their fieldwork 
a social system that was decapitated by colonial rule. 
Ethnohistory of an Indian Kinadom 
The Kallars, like the Maravars, settled in mixed economy 
zones (Ludden 1985) such as Pudukkottai on the borders of the 
central political and economic regions of the south. In these 
areas they quickly attained dominance in late medieval times by 
exercising rights of protection (patikkaval) over local 
communities and institutions. The Kallars were successful in 
this role because their strongly kin and territory based social 
structure and cultural valuation of heroism and honor were highly 
conducive to the corporate control of the means of violence and 
coercion. It was no accident that Kallars, like Maravars, were 
often, when not granted rights of protection, the very groups 
from which others sought protection. 
The Tondaiman dynasty of Kallar kings wrested control over a 
significant swath of the Pudukkottai region in central Tamil Nadu 
in the last quarter of the seventeenth century. Whereas Kallars 
had been branded as thieves in much early Tamil literature and as 
criminals by the British under the Criminal Tribes Act, in 
Pudukkottai--a little kingdom that became the only Princely State 
in the Tamil region of southern India--they became the royal 
caste. Kallars controlled much of the land, occupied the 
greatest number of authoritative positions, particularly as 
village and locality headmen and as miracidars, and ran the most 
important temples as trustees. These temples were often their 
lineage, village, or subcaste-territorial (natu) temples, in 
which they received honors only after the king and Brahmans. In 
short, Kallars were dominant not only in terms of their numbers, 
but for economic, political, and ritual reasons. 
Pudukkottai, which at its most extensive did not exceed 1200 
square miles, was located in an exclusively rain-fed 
agricultural zone right in the middle of the Tamil speaking 
region of southern India, straddling the boundary between what 
had been the two great medieval Tamil kingdoms. Ruled by Kallar 
kings, it provides an excellent place to test many of the 
proposals of Dumont, who, before he shaped the concerns of much 
contemporary Indian anthropology in his general proposals in this 
journal and in Homo Hierarchicus, portrayed Kallars in his major 
ethnographic work in India as a ritually marginal group that 
exemplified the Dravidian isolation of kinship from the influence 
of caste hierarchy. But in Pudukkottai, less than one hundred 
miles north of where Dumont conducted his fieldwork, Kallars were 
kinas; they exercised every conceivable kind of dominance and 
their social organization reflects this fact. 
Pudukkottai rose, as did other little kingdoms throughout 
southern India, within the context of a late medieval Hindu 
political order. In both its emergence to and its maintenance of 
power, it exemplified the social and military vitality of certain 
productively marginal areas in the seventeenth and eighteenth 
centuries, a period that has commonly been characterized as one 
of decline and decadence. But the eighteenth century was not the 
"black century:" the decentralization of political forms neither 
a condemnation of the capabilities of'the Indian state nor a 
natural prelude to British colonial rule. The British conquest 
of the little kings in the south was anything but absentminded, 
and there are indications not only that the economy was buoyant 
in part because of the active court centres ruled by these little 
kings, but that small and local level states were learning the 
political, military, and administrative lessons that the French 
and the English were learning at the same time. But win the 
British did, and thus their version of the eighteenth century has 
collaborated with a subsequent neglect of the seventeenth and 
eighteenth centuries by Western and Indian historians to provide 
the grist for comparative sociology's Indian mill. 
Colonialism purposefully preserved many of the forms of the 
old regime, nowhere more conspicuously than in the indirectly 
ruled Princely States. But these forms were frozen, and only the 
appearances of the old regime (without its vitally connected 
political and social processes) were saved. Colonialism changed 
things both more and less than has commonly been thought. While 
introducing new forms of civil society and separating these forms 
off from the colonial state, colonialism also arrested some of 
the immediate disruptions of change by preserving many elements 
of the old regime. But by freezing the wolf in sheep's clothing 
it changed things fundamentally. Paradoxically, colonialism 
seems to have created much of what is now accepted as Indian 
"tradition," including an autonomous caste structure with the 
Brahman clearly at the head, village based systems of exchange, 
isolated ceremonial residues of the old regime state, and 
fetishistic competition for ritual goods that no longer played a 
vital role in the political system. 
In my research on Pudukkottai, it took little study of local 
land records to uncover the most surprising historical 
characteristic of the political system: how little of the land 
was taxed. ~ccording to mid-nineteenth century records, less 
than thirty percent of the cultivated land was either taxed (9%) 
or given out from year to year on a share basis (18%) in which 
one ninth of the produce was accorded to village servants and 
four ninths each to the cultivator and the government. Seventy 
percent of the cultivated land was inam, or tax-free. This mid 
nineteenth century statistic was if anything far higher in the 
eighteenth century, when there were at the very least another 
five thousand military inams, i.e. forty percent more than the 
total number of inams in the mid nineteenth century, before the 
gradual dismantlement of the military system of the state. 
Roughly thirty percent of the inams (numbers of inam units rather 
than acreage) were for military retainers, their chiefs, and for 
palace guards and servants; twenty five percent were for village 
officers, artisans, and servants; and the remaining forty five 
percent were for the support of temples, monasteries, rest and 
feeding houses for Brahman priests and pilgrims, and land grants 
to Brahman communities. In terms of acreage, roughly nineteen 
percent of the alienated land was for military retainers et. al., 
seven percent for village officers, artisans, and servants, fifty 
one percent for temples, monasteries, and charities, and twenty 
two percent for Brahmans. Remember that these statistics reflect 
a demilitarized political system, so that both the numbers and 
percentages had earlier been far higher for military categories. 
Remember also that this particular kingdom was ruled over by 
kings of what have been said by most observers to be an unclean 
caste, inappropriate for Hindu kingship, and therefore 
inappropriate donors for Sanskritic temples and Brahmans. 
This structure of privileged landholding reflects the 
structure of political -power and socio-cultural participation 
within state and village institutions. The chief landholders 
were the great Kallar Jagirdars and Cervaikarars. The former 
were collateral relations of the Raja. Jagir estates were 
created for the two brothers of the Raja after a succession 
dispute in 1730 severely threatened the stability of the state. 
These collateral families kept these estates intact until their 
settlement in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century. 
The Jagirs were, in effect, mini kingdoms in their own right, 
each containing a small court and a full set of inam grants, 
including "military ones." Importantly, however, the jagirs were 
not made up of contiguous villages and were therefore never 
geographically isolable units. 
Just below the Jagirdars came the Cervaikarars. All but one 
of the Cervaikarars were of the same subcaste as the Raja, and 
most had one or more affinal ties with the royal family. The 
Cervaikarars were given large grants of land, titles, honors, and 
emblems. Each of the Cervaikarars was awarded a specified number 
of retainers, or amarakarars, to serve them at home, to go to 
battle with them abroad, and to carry their honors and emblems to 
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ritual occasions in the royal court and in temples. Lesser 
chiefs, called Kurikarars, came from Kallar subcastes other than 
royal one. Lands and privileges throughout the state were also 
given to other Kallars, called in diminutive form Cervais, to 
keep watch over villages and localities not dominated by loyal 
Kallars (i.e., all groups other than the Vicenki Nattu Kallars 
who were only finally brought under nominal control in a series 
of wars in the late eighteenth century). The Cervais were mostly 
members of the royal subcaste who had no affinal ties with the 
royal family. 
The royal family and court was itself protected by 
Uriyakarars, all of whom were Akampatiyars, members of a non 
Kallar caste which was aligned with the Kallars through ', 
membership in a special metacaste of three warrior groups along 
with the Maravars called the mukkulattur. These royal protectors 
in fact became a separate subcaste marked off terminologically 
and affinally from other Akampatiyars in the region by virtue of 
their connection with and service to the Raja. A number of 
Uriyakarar chiefs had a prominent role in the kingdom. Like most 
of the lesser chiefs, these chiefs were given extensive lands but 
no formal group of military retainers under them. 
In addition, within each village in the state, headmen were 
given lands in recognition of their rights to local authority as 
well as to render this representative of the state's power at 
large. These headmen came from the locally dominant castes. 
Kallars were dominant in the northern and eastern parts of the 
state. Maravars had a significant presence in the south. 
Arnpalams (the title for headman, literally meaning the central 
common ground of the village, used by most of the castes in 
~udukkottai) were also called miracidars after the mid-eighteenth 
century. This new label, borrowed from Persian revenue 
terminology, was used in an attempt to render local authority as 
dependent as possible on recognition by the "bureaucratic" state. 
Nonetheless, well into the twentieth century these local headmen 
were often as powerful as small kings, with retinues and legends 
sufficient to cause their power to be felt over significant areas 
of the countryside. 
Various village officials, artisans, and servants were also 
given inam (more properly maniyam) lands by the state. In 
addition to this land, each village servant was also rewarded 
with shares of the village grain heap. Since the one-ninth share 
of the harvest that was owed to village servants was taken from 
the grain heap before its division into the Raja's and the 
village's share, this classic jajmani payment was borne equally 
by the village and the Raja. Thus, the sets of relations usually 
characterized as jajmani, that is as an institution of the 
village community alone, were sanctioned and underwritten not 
only by the community but also by the king both through inams and 
the share system. 
Maniyam, the term used for many village grants, meant land 
that was held free of tax, as well as privilege in a more general 
sense. Maniyam derives from the Sanskrit manya, which means 
honor and privi1eg.e. Many of the land grants to Brahmans were 
called carvamaniyam, meaning completely tax free and honorable. 
However, the term maniyam was not reserved for Brahmans, as 
British categories which separated "religious" from 
"nonreligious" grants implied. Indeed, in its most unmarked form 
maniyam was sometimes used for inams in general. Maniyam was 
also used in a more marked sense for land grants given to village 
servants whose task was to maintain and operate irrigational 
facilities, to village officers or headmen, to the pujaris or 
priests of small village temples or shrines, and to inamdars 
(holders of inams) who had such variable responsibilities as 
blowing the conch for a village festival or tending a flower 
garden which produced garlands of the village deities. These 
maniyams reveal that royal grants sustained the entire structure 
of local village ritual. 
Even small locality temples were linked to the king through 
the inam. These local temples organized the ritual systems of 
villages, often constituting some of its fundamental cultural 
coordinates as well: they demarcated boundaries, centers, the 
relationships of social groups within the village, defining and 
internally ranking lineages, subcastes, and castes. Service to 
the temple was in many respects structurally equivalent to 
service to the village community, even as most village service 
inams specified services to both temples and the village, as 
suggested for Sri Lanka as well in the work of Hocart, who saw 
each village service group as a priesthood, and thus saw caste as 
an institution that was simultaneously political and religious. 
In addition to many inams granted to village and local 
temples in the form of maniyams to local priests and village 
servants, many inam grants were also made to Brahmans, temples, 
and charities of various sorts. As is well know, the principal 
sources for south Indian historiography are epigraphical records 
of such grants, publically proclaimed because of the merit which 
accrued to the donors from them and because of the centrality of 
these gifts to the ideology of kingship. One of the fundamental 
requirements of Indic kingship was that the king be a munificent 
provider of fertile lands for Brahmans who would study and chant 
the Vedas, perform sacrifices and provide ritual services for the 
king so as to ensure and protect his prosperity and that of his 
kingdom; for temples which were the centers of worship and for 
festivals such as Dassara which renewed the sovereignty of the . 
king and regenerated the kingdom; and for cattirams (chatrams, 
also called choultries, which were feeding, sometimes lodging, 
houses for pilgrims) which provided sustenance and shelter for 
itinerant Brahmans and pilgrims. The merit (punyam) of the king 
who made the grant could be shared by all those who protected the 
gift, a duty enjoined upon all subsequent kings. In spite of 
Pudukkottai's marginal social and political position, 'it was well 
endowed with temples and brahmanic institutions precisely because 
of the prevailing force of royal ideology. 
The underlying political base of any little kingdom in the 
old regime was its military capacity.  his capacity was in turn 
based on structures of alliance and command, which were 
articulated by gifts, privileges of varying kinds, and kinship. 
No little kingdom could survive if it did not have an efficient 
system of military mobilization. These systems were organized 
around subordinate chieftains, connubial connections, and 
privileged landholding rather than a centralized or 
bureaucratically organized system of revenue collection and 
military rule. Royal grants helped to sustain military 
organization as well as local village ritual and an impressive 
complex of larger temples and brahmanic settlements. The 
political economy (by which I mean here the institution of 
kingship, the distribution of authority, and the nature and 
structure of resource allocation) was based on a logic of 
redistribution that penetrated far and wide. 
The gift of land without onerous burdens of taxation, the 
occasional participation in wars in which honor and booty could 
be won, and the organization of land and military rights in 
relations of ritual clientage to chiefly and kingly patrons 
resulted not only in a political system of great fluidity and 
dynamism, but one in which individuals could vie for relative 
distinction in a social system where honor was intimately tied up 
with rank through interpenetrating forms of political and ritual 
action. The valued constituents of sovereign authority were 
differentially and partially shared through the redistributive 
mechanisms of the gift. Service was offered as a way of entering 
this redistributive system. Kinship (a relatively open and 
inflected system) became the social base and expression of social 
and political relations. Honor, in particular the emblems and 
privileges that were given with each grant (itself a privilege), 
but also the honors in temples that were procured through worship 
and were ordered in relation to local and royal prerogatives, was 
both the mediation and the mechanism by and through which 
relations were established. 
Thus I argue that the royal gift was basic to statecraft in 
all the kingdoms of the old order in southern India. All gifts 
were not the same; but they all shared one thing in common: they 
were given by the king. The substance of the gift (the land 
rights, titles, emblems, honors, and privileges of service, 
usufruct, and command) was the partial sovereign substance of the 
king. Participation in the king's sovereignty was not, however, 
unranked, for the differential nature and contingent character of 
all these entitlements provided the basis for the creation of a 
political hierarchy. Ultimately, entitlements by their very 
nature constituted hierarchy through a logic of variable 
proximity to the king, to sovereignty itself. What Geertz has 
written about Bali is true of the old order in south India: "The 
whole of the negara (court life, the traditions that organized 
it, the extractions that supported it, the privileges that 
accompanied it) was essentially directed toward defining what 
power was; and what power was what kings were." 
My sense of the meaning of royal gifts was initially based 
not only a reading of land records, which though they gave 
histories of grants, revealed a thick infrastructure of gifting, 
and suggested that land rights were necessarily conjoined with 
other rights to privilege, service, and honor, were themselves 
insufficiently explicit about the ideological content of the 
system to permit a full or satisfactory interpretation. Rather, 
I developed an understanding of kingly beneficence from textual 
sources that depicted the centrality of gifts and their various 
forms. Using eighteenth century texts (genealogies, chronicles, 
ballads) as cultural discourses, I found persistent motifs, 
events, narrative forms, tropes, and images, and I read the parts 
they played in the poetics of power. I used this textualized 
discourse not only, as at first I thought was all I could do, to 
get a sense of how these Indians conceived their own past, but 
also to demarcate the key elements of my subsequent inquiry, to 
create an historiographical frame for understanding key 
structures, events, and their relations: and I found that my 
textualized readings were indeed realized in historical 
processes. Thus I was able to identify and focus on the core 
conceptions of sovereignty; the interpenetrating transactions in 
gifts, service, and kinship; the structure and form of political 
hegemony. I was able to understand what had previously been 
obscured in the colonial writing on the little kings, or 
poligars, that the adoption of Hindu forms of kingship by what 
were said to be low caste (later often defined as criminal castes 
under British rule) chiefs was not just an ideological ruse but 
was rather reflected in the entire structure of the political 
system; that rights to landholding were political rights, and 
reflected the structure of the little kingdom at the same time 
that they revealed the pervasive importance of royal honor; and 
that the states were not absolute failures because of their lack 
of emphasis on the bureaucratic demarcation of land rights and 
the collection of revenue, but rather successful, vital, and to 
the British highly threatening political systems because of the 
interplay of rights and privileges to land, service, kinship, 
honor, and local resources. 
The Cultural Poetics of Power 
But I was still not altogether clear if, and if so how, a 
logic of variable proximity to the king actually informed social 
relations in the little kingdom. It was this, in a general 
sense, that was the subject of a subsequent year's ethnographic 
research. It was only in my fieldwork that I was able to find 
that the forms of clan and caste structure that the British had 
seen as organic growths from the Indian soil had in fact been 
vitally transformed by the political histories of local level 
chiefs. First, through inquiries conducted in the field I 
determined that the political hierarchy was also, with certain 
crucial exceptions, a social hierarchy. As I mentioned above, 
the Jagirdars were collateral chiefs, the Cervaikarars affinally 
connected warriors, the Kurikarars mostly Kallars but from 
subcastes other than the royal subcaste, and so on down the line. 
The Kallars themselves were, as Durnont also found for the 
Pramalai Kallar, territorially segmented, but in Pudukkottai the 
royal subcaste occupied a uniquely important position, dominating 
all the other segments, or subcastes. The internal organization 
of the royal subcaste, markedly different than all other 
subcastes, itself reflected a systematic if sometimes paradoxical 
inflection by political forces. And the settlement of Kallar 
chiefs, both great and small, throughout areas of non-Kallar 
settlement, as well as in the area inhabited by a large and often 
unruly Kallar subcaste, effected-both the ideological and 
instrumental dominance of royalty. These Kallars often had royal 
retainers under them, privileged rights to local lands, and the 
right to receive first honors on behalf of the Pudukkottai Raja 
in all village and locality temples and festivals. 
The hierarchical force of royalty was expressed in many 
ways, not least through the comments of one of my principal 
informants, the titular head of the royal clan or kuppam. "When 
we assumed our royal status (antastu)," this man told me, "we 
became, as it were, a royal family. Hence, we the five top 
lineages of the clan, began to have affinal relations only with 
royal families. So we became more elevated and dignified than 
the other groups and other clans. While the influence and glory 
of the Raja was high, the influence of those of us living in our 
group also went up accordingly. Others who do not have marriage 
ties with the five chief lineages also reside here but we 
classify them at a lower level." All members of the royal 
subcaste were loosely called rajapantu, meaning that they had a 
connection with the raja. While this term was used to designate 
all members of the subcaste in an unmarked sense, within the 
subcaste itself there were multiple distinctions of rank, all of 
them, as it turned out, having to do with proximity of the king. 
In one particularly lucid discussion, my informant explained to 
me the logic of hierarchy in Pudukkottai. "Why are we (meaning 
royal Kallars) superior?" he asked rhetorically. "Because we 
maintain control and order (kattupatu) in our community. We do 
not allow widow remarriage and we abide by the moral codes of our 
society strictly. Other Kallars may say that all Kallars are the 
same. It is popularly assumed that all Kallars are thieves. But 
we are not thieves. How can the ruling Kallars steal from 
others? Our Kallars are pillars of the community, chiefs, 
village leaders, politicians, and nobles. We have to maintain 
law and order. How can we go off thieving. We decided that we 
should lead a life of order and restriction. Others are not like 
us. We live for honor and status. Our Kallars base our lives on 
the temple and on marriage relations. Only if the temple and the 
lineage are correct can we seek an alliance; Our honor is 
displayed in the palace and in temples. When honor is measured, 
in the same way the number of carats is measured in gold, will we 
like less dignified groups taking seats on a par with us. No, 
they are not fit to sit with us." 
The preeminence of the royal subcaste is thus explained not 
only through reference to the fact that the king hailed from this 
subcaste, but by noting that this subcaste has the most rigidly 
defined and maintained code for conduct of all subcastes. These 
Kallars have the most order, and they enforced order through the 
set of restrictions which are implied by the term kattupatu. 
Kattupatu, which can be taken to mean code for conduct and 
discipline, literally means something more like restriction, or 
even constriction, deriving from the root kattu, meaning tied or 
knotted. The code for conduct includes rigidly defined kinship 
rules, some of which, like the Brahmanic prohibition of widow 
remarriage, mark the royal Kallars off from all other Kallars and 
suggest a kind of Sanskritization, others of which involve 
working ones way through the myriad gradations of upper Kallar 
society by trading political, social, and cultural capital back 
and forth, often through affinal transactions. Kattupatu is a 
term that is used frequently by all Kallar subcastes and indeed 
all Pudukkottai castes, though only among Kallars, and 
specifically within the royal subcaste of Kallars, does it have 
the particular kind of inflection I just described. For all 
these groups, though again most importantly for the royal 
subcaste, kattupatu does not mean simply a code for conduct, but 
a set of authoritative procedures which renders this code 
enforceable within the community. 
My informant's statements, and the general ideological 
orientation they reflect, reveal the continuation of concerns 
about the past reputation of Kallars as thieves, bandits, 
outlaws. The ethnographic discourse here shares much in common 
with the eighteenth century family histories that I mentioned 
earlier. In these texts as in the statements of Kallar 
informants the acknowledged past becomes totally transformed by 
the attainment of kingship. Again, there is an implicit 
opposition between the representation of the activities of 
thieves and the activities of kings. In this case, the royal 
duty of protecting and subduing disorder is combined with an 
ideology of order and restriction which organizes and becomes the 
subtext of the social relations of the subcaste. 
The very word Kallar means thief in Tamil, and no one, at 
least none of my informants, disputes the fact that at certain 
places and times particular groups of Kallars engaged in 
predatory activity. In fact they constantly bring it up with a 
certain kind of relish, suggesting only partial embarrassment 
about their past. And as I and others have written elsewhere, 
this in itself is not necessarily a problem in any case, since 
predation was often the principal means used to accumulate wealth 
by kings who were not so concerned about a regularized tax base 
as the British became when they began in the early nineteenth 
century to gain most of their profit from land revenue. In 
Pudukkottai, Kallars attained their position of royal authority 
in the first place by providing protection to local communities 
and institutions, and this is amply documented in inscriptions 
recording protection contracts from the fourteenth century on. 
Indeed, Kallars were given rights of protection because of their 
capacity to control, and to a very large extent monopolize, the 
means of violence, and there is much in Indian tradition to 
suggest that the opposition of bandit and king is a complementary 
opposition. But it is, culturally speaking, an opposition: the 
violence of the bandit is illegitimate, and it represents and 
causes the disorder that the legitimate violence of the king must 
control. Kings are not only legitimate, they define the realm of 
the legitimate. And the way in which the royal subcaste 
organizes its social relations makes it impossible that they 
could be thieves, or affected in any way by this general 
reputation. The royal subcaste is headed by a king, and it 
provides almost all the royal nobles of the kingdom. The 
fundamental duty of these members of the elite is to subdue 
disorder, destroy lawlessness, and enforce law and order, both 
within the kingdom at large, and within the subcaste itself. And 
of course, as kings, by virtue of defining what is legitimate, 
they define disorder too. 
But this is true in more than just the obvious, or for that 
matter the Foucaultian, sense, as I discovered when doing 
fieldwork with other caste groups. For most castes, there is a 
steady decrease of order as one goes down the caste hierarchy, in 
the sense defined by my Kallar informants and assimilated with 
only minimal dissent by many non-Kallar informants. Maravars, 
for example, who in all fundamental respects were like Kallars 
except for the crucial fact that they were not kings, had found 
it impossible to organize their social relations in the larger 
territorial units, the natus, that Kallars had, and the Maravars 
lamented this loudly and frequently. Indeed, the Maravars 
themselves attributed this disorder not just to the general 
decline and fall of the world in general, but more particularly 
to their loss of political control. For other groups, there was 
not only a noticeable decline in order, and a laxness in defining 
and maintaining the kattupatu, there was also a decline in the 
autonomy to define what order was. Untouchable groups, for 
example, took the locality, and sometimes the lineage, names of 
their dominant caste patrons. Whereas other groups had 
traditional rights called kaniyatci to land, honor, etc., 
untouchables told me that for them kaniyatci only meant the right 
to serve their patrons. The fundamental structures of their 
social relations were inscribed by the hegemony of the dominant 
classes. Notions of honor, order, royalty, and command have been 
operationalized in the practices that produce and reproduce 
hierarchy. These practices (embedded as they are in cultural 
forms and historical processes) are themselves based on 
structures of power as well as on the hegemonic nature of 
cultural constructions of power. 
If it be argued that my interpretation, though perhaps true 
for marginal regions like Pudukkottai, can hardly apply generally 
to south India, let alone to the subcontinent as a whole, I reply 
that is precisely the marginality of Pudukkottai that makes it 
possible to detect the forces that were at work elsewhere. 
Because Pudukkottai was not brought under patrimonial control 
(neither that of the Islamic rulers in the south nor later that 
of the ~ritish) caste was never set completely loose from 
kingship. Many current theories of caste, particularly those 
emphasizing Brahmanic obsessions concerning purity and impurity, 
but also those aspects of ethnosociological theory that stress 
the proper and improper mixing of substances, are in large parts 
artifacts of colonialism, referring to a situation in which the 
position of the king and the historical dynamic of royal power 
has been displaced, and sometimes destroyed. However much 
Dumont's theory is predicated on an a.priori separation of what 
he describes as the domains of religion and politics, which the 
former encompassing the latter, he was also almost certainly 
influenced by an ethnographic reality in which kingship played 
only a very small, residual role. As for early ethnosociological 
proposals about caste, Inden has himself recently noted that his 
early work is largely derived from texts which were generated 
only after the demise of kingship as a powerful cultural 
institution (Inden 1983). The texts, he now says, reflected new 
traditions which attempted to deal with the problem of regulating 
caste interaction in an environment in which there was no longer 
a king. 
Qn Dumont: The Politics of Hierarchv 
Politics, as we define it here, has both to do with the 
processes by which authority is constituted at each level of 
representation and with the linkages of the constituent groups in 
society to the king (usually through the authoritative figures 
who represent their social groups). Politics has a territorial 
dimension, but is not exhausted by territorial forms. In the 
royal subcaste of Kallars in ~udukkottai, the intervention of the 
king changed and reconstructed (as well as decomposed) the 
internal order of the system, affecting both social and 
territorial forms. Even in other subcastes, less directly 
influenced by kingship, social organization was only 
understandable within a framework which is fundamentally 
political, realized over time (i.e., in history). 
It is my argument here that structures of power play a 
central role in the social organization of caste and kinship, 
that politics is fundamental to the process of hierarchialization 
and the formation of units of identity. Durnont has great 
difficulty with the notion that kinship can be politicized. When 
he does see hierarchical tendencies develop in the domain of 
kinship he blames them on the ideology of caste, which has to do 
not with politics but with purity and pollution. Dumont's 
elevation of alliance as the fundamental principle of south 
Indian kinship is in large part because alliance mitigates the 
asymmetrical effects of marriage relations through the 
generalized exchange of marriage.partners within the endogamous 
group. Hierarchy creeps to the borders of the endogamous group, 
but only enters in the sense that it can bring about the creation 
of new endogamous subdivisions. Nonetheless, even though Dumont 
suggests (Dumont 1957a; 1957b) the powerful role of political 
dominance in creating alliances and particular marriage patterns, 
he explains any such endogamous subdivisions by saying that they 
arise through bastardy or the differential status of wives in a 
polygynous marriage. Endogamous groups develop within previous 
endogamous groups only because of the lower status attached to 
marriages with women from outside the proper alliance group. 
Politics not only occupies a subordinate position in 
Dumont's general theory, but is eclipsed on the one side by the 
preeminence of kinship, invaded by social bastardy and caste 
hierarchy, and on the by caste, which elevates the -brahman, and 
attendant principles of purity and pollution, above the king. 
Caste, and the hierarchical principle it entails, is fundamental 
because it is religious, and in Indian social thought, according 
to Dumont, the religious encompasses the social, the economic, 
and the political. 
Dumont therefore sees caste authority and political 
authority as fundamentally different. He writes that "the notion 
of caste and of a superior caste exhausts all available 
transcendence. Properly speaking, a people's headman can only be 
someone of another caste. If the headman is one of their own, 
then to some degree they are all headmen" (Dumont 1957b, 206). 
This is true in Pudukkottai in that headmen are at one level 
simply primus inter pares in their social group. However, by 
virtue of their connection to the king, they do "transcend," at 
some level, their own community. Most importantly, the king 
himself is at one level simply a Kallar, and not the highest one 
at that. But by virtue of his kingship, not caste transcendence, 
he is also the transcendent overlord of the entire kingdom. 
Hierarchy in Pudukkottai concerns transcendence in the 
context of kingship, where the king is both a member of a 
segmentary lineage system and the overlord of the entire kingdom. 
What would seem contradictory to Dumont is the paradox upon which 
the entire caste system rests. Kinship is inflected, at its 
core, by politics; and politics is nothing more than the curious 
paradox of a king who encompasses all even as he is one of his 
own metonyrns. In the social and political world of the little 
kingdom, this meant that the king was an overlord, but one who 
was nonetheless always embroiled in the strategic concerns of 
kinship, status hierarchy, protection and warfare, and in the 
maximization of his own honor and sovereign authority within the 
little kingdom and in a wider world of other kingdoms and greater 
overlords. 
Part of Durnont's resistance to acknowledging the political 
inflection of caste and kinship may result from the political 
marginality of the Pramalai Kallars, a marginality rendering them 
far more similar to the unruly Vicenki Nattu Kallars who lived in 
the northwestern part of Pudukkottai State than to the royal 
subcaste. With both the Pramalai Kallars and the VN Kallars, the 
lack of well developed affinal boundaries corresponding to 
discrete territorial units, as well as of a distinct sense of the 
hierarchy of groups, can perhaps be explained by their incomplete 
incorporation within (and therefore inflection by) the political 
system of a little kingdom. Everywhere in Tamil Nadu the Kallars 
had highly developed notions of territory, but subcaste 
organization achieved its particular level of territorial 
segmentation and hierarchical articulation in Pudukkottai alone. 
And only within the royal subcaste of Pudukkottai did Kallars 
develop the pronounced and complex forms of territorial bounding 
and hierarchical marking that they did, and which I describe in 
great detail elsewhere (1987). Kingship does make a difference. 
Some of Dumontls theoretical problems stem from the fact 
that he does not pursue an interest in the ethnohistorical 
reconstruction of the Pramalai Kallars. He is aware of the 
modern decline of headmanship, and that it no longer expresses 
itself as fully as it might once have done in the social logic of 
Pramalai organization. Characteristically acute, he senses a 
correlation with recent political change: "If authority rests on 
external sanction, it is to be expected that it cannot maintain 
-itself without formal government recognition" (~umont 1957b, 
203). Unfortunately, he does not consider the possibility that 
colonialism, and the attendant break down of the old regime, have 
much to do with the development of the separation of religion and 
politics which he has identified and reified into a timeless 
Indian social theory. A combination of theoretical program, 
ethnographic "accident," and historical disinterest have 
conspired to render Durnont's understanding of the Kallars, 
however brilliant, limited in fundamental ways. 
Here and elsewhere I have argued that the social relations 
that made up Indian society, far from being "essentialist" 
structures predicated on the transcendence of a set of religious 
principles, were permeated by "political" inflections, meanings, 
and imperatives. Caste, as it is still portrayed in much current 
anthropological literature, is a colonial construction, 
reminiscent only in some ways of the social forms that preceded 
colonial intervention. The structural relations that made up the 
"caste system" in Pudukkottai thus reflect--albeit with the 
distortions of ethnohistorical time--the ideological proposals of 
my informants. These ideological statements consistently 
referred to the historical means by and through which meaning was 
constructed and maintained. Caste, if ever it had an original 
form, was inscribed from the "beginning" by the relations and 
conceits of power. And in medieval and early modern south India, 
it is clear that Geertz was indeed right: power was what kings 
were. 
Bthnohistory and Ethnosocioloay 
"We need history, but not the way a spoiled loafer in the 
garden of knowledge needs it." 
Nietzsche, Of the Use and Abuse of Historv. 
When I first began to use the term ethnohistory to describe 
the particular blend of history and anthropology that I sought to 
practice in my study of India, I thought that "ethno" should do 
the same thing to history that it seemed to be doing to 
sociology. Of course the place was Chicago, the time the mid- 
seventies, and the word was culture. But even then, and even 
despite the fact that in my work I sought to construct my sense 
of what it meant to do history in light of "indigenous" 
historical texts, ethnohistory struggled against itself. Not 
only did ethnohistorians seem constantly to pose the questions 
about epistemological mediation that began only rather later to 
deconstruct the original assumptions of ethnosociology (questions 
such as, how does an outsider attain access to or re-present a 
culturally specific form of knowledge?), but culture as a domain 
was much more difficult to lock up (or off) as a separate area of 
inquiry. The injunction, "Always historicize! , " seemed aiways 
already there. But, then as now, it was not always clear what 
the injunction meant. 
Originally, ethnohistory meant the reconstruction of the 
history of an area and people who had no written history. As 
such, it was used to denote in particular the field of studies 
concerning the past of American Indians, and secondarily of other 
so-called primitive or pre-literate societies. But, as many have 
since demonstrated, ethnohistory cannot be restricted to the 
unwritten or oral sources for history in most parts of the world 
where texts and written sources exist, even if they do not seem 
to penetrate some sectors of society. In India, as in many other 
places, there are no pure oral traditions: texts have provided 
the basis for tradition as often as the other way round. Indeed, 
both texts and traditions relate not only to each other, but also 
to historical processes of production and social forms of 
contextualization, interpretation, and certification. 
Ethnohistory in India is clearly not about the history of 
primitive or preliterate people. 
As suggested above, ethnohistory is also not simply a gloss 
for a cultural analysis of historical sensibilities in India, 
whether embodied in texts or traditions. However, part of the 
task of ethnohistory is to contest the dominant voice of history, 
which in India has always been a Western voice. This voice has 
always disparaged India, insisting that the relative absence of 
chronological political narrative and the unsettling presence of 
myth and fancy are indicative of an underdeveloped sense of 
history. Ethnohistory can therefore assist in the project of 
recuperating a multiplicity of historical voices, revealing for 
India an active, vital, and integral historiographical industry. 
I have also argued that ethnohistory can help determine a 
culturally specific set of relevancies, moments, and narrative 
forms to expand and alter the sense of how to think about India's 
past. But this past is never contained solely within the texts 
or traditions that would be used for this task. If 
ethnohistory is used to situate history, it is always seen as 
itself situated in history (see also Dening 1980, 38). 
Thus the difficulties in anthropologizing history are not 
simply removed by the inverse call to historicize anthropology, 
for we never seem to reach explicit agreement about what history 
actually means. But in this case the problem and the solution 
are integrally interrelated. For if an investigation into the 
culture of history has both the strengths and the weaknesses of 
ethnosociology, an exploration of what is involved in the history 
of culture can assist in making a creative critique of culture 
theory, whether in ethnosociology or elsewhere. Not only has 
ethnosociology been insufficiently clear about the 
epistemological privilege it assumes in its claim to re-present 
indigenous forms of knowledge, it has completely excluded a wide 
range of historical questions, as also any consideration of the 
relations of knowledge and power beyond a narrow cultural domain. 
This is not the place, however, to summarize the arguments 
of Gramsci, Williams, Bakhtin, Bourdieu, Foucault, and other 
theorists who have helped specify and problematize the 
historicity of culture. It must suffice here to note that when 
culture is situated in history rather than opposed to it the 
concept of culture inevitably opens up. I began by using culture 
as a method and conceit to privilege the discursive claims of my 
Kallar informants in relation to Dumont's proposals about the 
nature of hierarchy in India. That is to say, I began by 
participating in the ethnosociological claim that if you 
investigate native terms and meanings you will find that 
hierarchy is about x and not about y. However, the cultural 
statements of my informants subverted the autonomy of a presumed 
cultural domain, and in particular the opposition between the 
political/historical and the cultural/religious. At the same 
time, the injunction to historicize, vague though it sometimes 
seemed, enticed me to enter the web of power, knowledge, and 
history that constituted both the world of reference as well as 
the necessary conditions for contemporary cultural discourse. 
Culture thus was a conceit that deconstructed itself through its 
own historical reference, for culture distilled and displayed 
(and often displaced) the historical legacy of its own hegemonic 
ascendence. 
The necessarily ambivalent position of history within any 
ethnohistorical project provides critical access to much of the 
current theoretical debate about culture. But ethnohistory 
should not simply disparage ethnosociology. For in calling 
attention to the hegemony of Western social science, 
ethnosociology both set some of the conditions for this kind of 
critique in Indian studies, and may yet have the last laugh. The 
theoretical concerns about culture articulated above are as 
Western in their dominant figures and intellectual histories as 
the more positivist social science from which we tried to free 
ourselves in previous decades. However, if "history" teaches us 
anything at all, it should at least help us dispose of the idea 
that culture can exist outside of history, however much this 
history--and I suspect any history--is always mediated through a 
multiplicity of cultural forms. 
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